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Abstract
Background: Inter-professional teamwork in the operating room is important for patient safety. The World Health
Organization (WHO) checklist was introduced to improve intraoperative teamwork. The aim of this study was to
evaluate the safety climate in a Swedish operating room setting before and after an intervention, using a revised
version of the WHO checklist to improve teamwork.
Methods: This study is a single center prospective interventional study. Participants were personnel working in
operating room teams including surgeons, anesthesiologists, scrub nurses, nurse anaesthetists and nurse assistants.
The study started with pre-interventional observations of the WHO checklist use followed by education on safety
climate, the WHO checklist, and non-technical skills in the operating room. Thereafter a revised version of the WHO
checklist was introduced. Post-interventional observations regarding the performance of the WHO checklist were
carried out. The Safety Attitude Questionnaire was used to assess safety climate at baseline and post-intervention.
Results: At baseline we discovered a need for improved teamwork and communication. The participants considered
teamwork to be important for patient safety, but had different perceptions of good teamwork between professions.
The intervention, a revised version of the WHO checklist, did not affect teamwork climate. Adherence to the revision of
the checklist was insufficient, dominated by a lack of structure.
Conclusions: There was no significant change in teamwork climate by use of the revised WHO checklist, which may be
due to insufficient implementation, as a lack of adherence to the WHO checklist was detected. We found deficiencies in
teamwork and communication. Further studies exploring how to improve safety climate are needed.
Trial registration: NCT02329691.
Keywords: Patient safety, Operating room, Safety climate, Teamwork, WHO checklist
Background
Each year approximately 234 million surgeries are per-
formed worldwide, and in 3 – 16% patients suffer from
major complications [1]. To reduce complications and
improve results after surgery both technical and non-
technical skills are required [2]. The operating room
team consists of many professions, which complicates
the teamwork. Collaboration between team members
from different disciplines and with different educations
requires comprehensive coordination and cooperation.
Basic structure and mutual respect as well as team struc-
ture and a shared mental model allow individual team
members to understand and appreciate their own role as
well as those of others, resulting in more effective com-
munication [3, 4]. It is important that the basic structure
is well-known by all team members both outside and in-
side the operating room. Stout, et al. [3] describes a
shared mental model to provide the team members with
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a shared understanding of the team task and knowledge
about who is responsible for what. This allows the team
to anticipate one another’s needs so that they can work
as an effective team and make successful decisions.
In 2007 the World Health Organization (WHO) study
group ‘Safe surgery saves lives’ created a checklist: the
WHO Surgical Safety Checklist with the purpose to im-
prove intraoperative team communication and consistency
of care. Implementation of the checklist was found to re-
duce postoperative morbidity and mortality [5]. Insufficient
use of and/or missing items in the WHO checklist may
provide a false sense of security for the operating team [6].
Two concepts, safety culture and safety climate are
common when discussing safer surgery. Safety culture has
been described as reflections on the fundamental values of
an organization as well as norms, assumptions and expec-
tations. Safety climate [7] entails the employee’s percep-
tions, awareness, beliefs and attitudes about risk and
safety and has been measured using questionnaires such
as the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) [8].
There is a lack of knowledge regarding the safety cli-
mate in Swedish operating room settings [9]. The aim of
this study was to evaluate the teamwork and the safety
climate in a Swedish operating room setting before and
after implementation of a revised version of the WHO
checklist. Our hypothesis was that by using the WHO
checklist in a structured fashion and by adding a de-
scription of the surgical procedure and patient, we
would increase commitment and enhance the teamwork.
Methods
Setting and participants
The study was conducted at Sahlgrenska University Hos-
pital, Gothenburg, Sweden. Participants were personnel
working in operating room teams. The teams consisted of
the following professional groups: surgeons, anesthesiolo-
gists, scrub nurses, nurse anaesthetists and nurse assistants.
Together these professional groups consisted of 150
personnel (Fig. 1). Two collaborating organizational units
within the hospital were involved in this study, the
Fig. 1 Flow chart for participants in the study
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Department of Surgery and the Department of Anaesthesia.
All but the surgeons were formally employed by the Depart-
ment of Anaesthesia. Depending on the surgical procedure
the number of team members present in the operating
room differs, but in most cases the team consists of one
anesthesiologist, one nurse anaesthetist, two-three surgeons,
one scrub nurse and one nurse assistant. In each operating
room approximately 2–5 procedures are performed daily.
The anesthesiologists were responsible for several simultan-
eously ongoing surgical procedures, and were seldom
present in the operating room for the review of the WHO
checklist. The nurse anaesthetists were present in the oper-
ating room throughout the procedure. The nurse assistants
assist both the scrubbed and the anaesthetic team.
Study design
This is a single center prospective interventional study.
Chronological order for the study is demonstrated in Fig. 2.
The study period lasted 7 months, from November 2014
until June 2015. The study started with the questionnaire
SAQ measuring baseline (Nov 2014) followed by baseline
observations of the use of the original WHO checklist
(Nov 2014). The intervention period started with informa-
tion and education (Nov 26 2014) followed by Focus
groups (Dec 2014) and implementation of the revised
WHO checklist (Jan 12 2015). Post-intervention observa-
tions of the revised checklist were performed (Jan-March
2015) and the final SAQ post-intervention was measured
(June 2015). Prior to study start the operating room man-
agement consented to the implementation and the study.
Baseline measurements
Baseline WHO checklist
The Swedish version of the checklist was produced by
LÖF in 2009 [10]. In the operating rooms we studied the
WHO checklist had been in daily use since 2009, but
without previous evaluation. The implementation of the
checklist in 2009 consisted of a meeting with informa-
tion, including a film sequence about the importance of
the WHO checklist. The nurse assistant was assigned
the role as checklist coordinator. Shortly after introduc-
tion a customized revision of the checklist was made to
tailor it to the needs of this operating ward. A laminated
copy was available in each operating room.
Baseline Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ)
The intervention was evaluated with the SAQ - operat-
ing room (OR) version. The version used in this study is
derived both from the original SAQ OR version and
from a translated, validated Swedish version [9, 11]. Two
items not previously translated were used, the first was
‘Use the scale to describe the quality of communication
and collaboration you have experienced with: surgeons,
anesthesiologists, scrub nurses, nurse anaesthetists and
nurse assistants’ The second was the open ended question
‘What are your top three recommendations for improving
patient safety in the operating room?’ These two items
were back-and-forward translated and face-to-face vali-
dated, before use. SAQ contains six domains: teamwork
climate, safety climate, perception of management, job sat-
isfaction, working conditions and stress recognition.
The items in SAQ are on a 5 point Likert type-scale,
anchored by 1 = disagree strongly and 5 = agree strongly.
Two of the items, 12 and 24 had a reversed anchoring
and were re-coded prior to analysis. Individual items are
reported as above while scores were calculated for each
domain. The domain scales were transformed into a
score scaled 0–100 [7, 12]. The collaboration and com-
munication items of SAQ, anchored by 1 = very low and
5 = very high, were dichotomized with the cut off >3
(adequate).
SAQ was distributed two months prior to (baseline)
and two weeks after the end of the intervention (post-
intervention), respectively. SAQ was handed out during
staff meetings and personnel not attending such meet-
ings received it through the hospital’s internal mail. Each
questionnaire contained a unique study ID and study in-
formation and pre-addressed return envelopes were at-
tached. After two weeks a reminder was posted.
Baseline structured observations
Prior to the intervention observations were made at
baseline to evaluate the use of the original WHO check-
list. This was done by using a pre-defined Clinical
Fig. 2 Timeline for the study
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Record Form (CRF). The CRF consisted of both struc-
tured questions and field notes in the form of descriptive
and reflective notes. Observations continued until satur-
ation, when the data set was complete and nothing new
was being added. Saturation ensures that data is compre-
hensive and complete [13]. One of the authors (SE) per-
formed all observations. The observer briefly explained
her presence in the operating room before the start of
the procedure, and did not comment on how the check-
list was used.
The intervention
A key component of how the intervention was designed
was focus group meetings with the participants, aiming
at using ideas and experiences of the staff to adapt and
improve the original WHO checklist. This was followed
by educational sessions and dialogue meetings with par-
ticipants and finally the implementation of the revised
WHO checklist.
Focus groups
The personnel participating in the focus groups were di-
vided by professional categories into six focus groups
(surgeons divided into 3 groups dependent on surgical
specialty, scrub nurses, nurse anesthetists, nurse assis-
tants) and the focus groups were led by one of the au-
thors (SE) [14]. The focus groups consisted of 10–20
participants at each occasion. The anesthesiologists did
not recognize the need for further education and did not
participate in this part of the intervention. The focus
groups started with information about the WHO check-
list and possible improvements of the checklist were dis-
cussed. The idea of adding the item ‘description of the
surgical procedure’ to the WHO checklist was presented
to the participants. Three open-ended questions were
asked: ‘How can we work with the WHO checklist to
improve patient safety?’, ‘What parts are well functioning
today?’, ‘Are there any parts of the WHO checklist that
need revision?’ Information from the focus groups was
used to construct a revised version of the WHO
checklist.
Data from focus groups were analyzed using a qualita-
tive content analysis [15]. The focus group dialogues
were recorded and then transcribed. The texts were ini-
tially read multiple times to identify the main focus. The
text was divided into meaning units that were condensed
and categorized [15]. The interpretations were done by
two of the authors (SE, AEA).
The qualitative content analysis of the six focus groups
resulted in two categories described below [15].
Inadequate structure concerning the WHO checklist
There was uncertainty regarding who was the designated
checklist coordinator and this was described as
confusing and causing lack of focus. The nurse assistants
found it difficult to initiate ‘Time out’ as their role was
insufficiently recognized. They also felt that the surgeons
had a lack of focus and gave the last part of the check-
list, ‘Sign out’ a low priority and this was confirmed by
the surgeons themselves. The nurse assistants were in
charge of the hospital phones in the operating room, but
they were uncertain about how to handle incoming calls
for the surgeons, who have to be reachable when they
are responsible for a surgical ward. Many surgeons also
left their private mobile phone with the nurse assistants
and as the surgeons’ preferences differed, the ‘phone
question’ was a problem. Surgeons expressed that fre-
quent changes of team members during a procedure re-
quired repeated ‘Time out’ for the WHO checklist to
remain meaningful. The nurse anaesthetists suggested
that ‘Sign out’ should be completed during wound clos-
ure before it was possible for the surgeons to leave the
operating room. Information from the last item ‘What
can we learn, what can we do better next time?’ was sug-
gested to be saved for future improvements.
Benefits of improved description of the surgical procedure
‘It is really great that you have increased the focus on the
patient, we should all have that focus.’ All groups
responded positively to a revision of the checklist with a
more detailed description of the surgical procedure. The
surgeons saw the description of the surgical procedure
as an opportunity to educate the team on what was im-
portant for the specific operation.
Educational settings
All participants were invited to informative and educa-
tional events, including inter-professional lectures in large
groups. On these occasions the topics safety culture, safety
climate in health care, the importance of non-technical
skills in the operating rooms and the importance of WHO
checklist were covered. Information was also sent to the
participants by e-mail on several occasions.
The revised WHO checklist
In the revised WHO checklist four changes were made
to checklist procedure:
1. The checklist was filled out on paper for each
surgical procedure, and the checklist coordinator
checked each item box with a pen to ensure that all
items were reviewed.
2. For ‘Sign in’, one question was added: ‘Presence of
metal implant?’ to remind the nurse anaesthetist to
ask the patient, and to report the answer to the team.
3. At ‘Time out’ a section called ‘Description of the
surgical procedure’ was added. It included a more
thorough explanation of the underlying indication
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for surgery and, information about the surgical
procedure and the patient. The intention was to
increase the clinical understanding in the team and
thereby improve the shared situational awareness
and the team work.
4. At ‘Time out’ ‘How to manage incoming telephone
calls?’ was added as a help to the nurse assistant to
address incoming calls to the surgeon during
surgery, according the surgeon’s own preference.
Before the implementation of the revised checklist par-
ticipants were once again gathered in groups. The entire
staff was informed about the changes to the checklist
through information on meetings, e-mails and inform-
ative memos.
Post-intervention
Structured observations during use of the revised WHO
checklist
Structured onsite observations was one of the evaluation
tools used to evaluate the use of the revised version of the
WHO checklist. The revised checklist was implemented
on 12 January. During the period, 12 January to 12 May
2014, 1267 checklists were used, whereof 264 (21%) were
completely filled out, with no omissions. Thirty-five struc-
tured observations were conducted during this period.
The observational data were analyzed and categorized in
relation to: ‘Sign in’, ‘Time out’ and ‘Sign out’.
Post-intervention Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ)
SAQ was used both at baseline and post-intervention. In
order to assess the ‘teamwork climate’, communication
and collaboration among different professions was
analyzed.
SAQ post-intervention was distributed two weeks after
the end of the period of using the revised WHO check-
list. SAQ was once again handed out during staff meet-
ings and personnel not attending the meetings received
the questionnaire through the hospital’s internal mail.
Analysis methods
Qualitative analysis
Focus groups, observations, and the open-ended ques-
tion from SAQ ‘What are your top three recommenda-
tions for improving patient safety in the operating
room?’ were analyzed using a qualitative content ana-
lyzes [15]. The observations and the SAQ were divided
into time-sequences before abstraction. The analysis was
conducted using NVivo 10, qualitative data analysis Soft-
ware (QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 10, 2012).
Statistical analysis
For domain scores, intra-individual changes as well as
between professional categories were evaluated by paired
t-test and analysis of covariance, respectively. Software
used were SPSS, version 22 (SPSS).
Results
Baseline Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ)
The operating rooms studied had a staff of 150 persons,
including surgeons, anesthesiologists, scrub nurses, nurse
anaesthetists and nurse assistants (Fig. 2), of whom 121
(81%) answered the baseline questionnaire.
‘Job satisfaction’ at baseline showed the highest score
(Table 1). The lowest score was found in ‘perception of
management’.
At baseline, surgeons and anesthesiologists scored sig-
nificantly higher than nurses regarding ‘Teamwork climate’
(72.2 SD 10 vs 62.2 SD 16.2 p = 0.001) for details see
Table 2.
The analysis of separate items in ‘Teamwork climate’
showed that doctors appreciated input from nurses while
nurses did not perceive this (Table 3). The same pattern
was found in the item ‘I have the support I need from
other personnel to care for our patients’. The anesthesi-
ologists experienced that doctors and nurses work as a
well-coordinated team, while the other members of the
team did not.
At baseline there were discrepancies between percep-
tions of good communication between professional
groups. Most professions found the communication
within their group to be the best (Table 4).
Baseline structured observations
The observations revealed that checklist items were
often omitted. At ‘Time out’ the most commonly omit-
ted items were ‘What are the critical or unexpected
steps?’, ‘Expected operative duration?’, and ‘Anticipated
blood loss?’ whereas ‘Specimen labelling’ and ‘What can
we learn from this procedure, what can we do better
next time?’ were the most commonly omitted items at
‘Sign out’.
Structured observations during use of the revised
WHO checklist
Sign in
Deficiency in coordination and structure regarding
the performance of ‘Sign in’ ‘Sign in’ was mostly per-
formed after ‘Time out’. In most cases the nurse assist-
ant handed the checklist to the nurse anaesthetists for
completion without involvement of other team mem-
bers’ and after ‘Time out’.
Time out
The quality of the performance varied depending on
individual team members Focus from all team mem-
bers was essential in order to perform ‘Time out’ ad-
equately. On occasion the nurse assistant was ignored, or
Erestam et al. Patient Safety in Surgery  (2017) 11:4 Page 5 of 10
team members didn’t communicate or listen, or answered
just some of the items. On other occasions the nurse as-
sistant read only part of the checklist. The ‘description of
the surgical procedure’ was often incomplete, to the dis-
satisfaction of the nurses. Some of the surgeons seemed
reluctant to perform this part of the checklist.
Sign out
Lack of structure and clear guidelines reduced focus
At ‘Sign out’ the team often appeared unfocused. On
most occasions ‘Sign out’ was conducted in an unstruc-
tured fashion with a lack of leadership.
Post-intervention Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ)
103 (72%) participants answered the SAQ post-
intervention, but only 72 of the participants responded
at both Baseline and Post-intervention (Fig. 2). Among
these 72 there was no change in average domain scores
associated with the use of the revised checklist apart
from the domain ‘Perception of management’ which
decreased significantly (Table 1). There was no change in
teamwork climate or communication and collaboration
between professions from baseline to post-
intervention. Among the different professions, the
nurse assistants reported an improvement in safety
climate. Physicians scored significantly higher than
nurses (69 SD 11.2 vs 61 SD 13.2 p = 0.006), in the
domain ‘Teamwork climate’, both before and after the
intervention, for details see Table 2.
Safety attitude questionnaire — open ended question
Eighty-seven (73%) participants answered the open-
ended question at baseline and 68 (67%) in the post-
Table 2 SAQ domain scores, a comparison between doctors and nurses
Domain Profession Baseline Post-intervention Change
(n) Mean (SD) p-value (n) Mean (SD) p-value (n) a Mean SEM P-value
Team work climate Doctors 34 72 10.0 0.001 27 69 11.2 0.006 16 −1.8 1.6 0.700
Nurses 72 62 16.2 61 61 13.2 47 1.0 2.8
Job satisfaction Doctors 42 75 14.6 0.856 37 73 12.3 0.551 22 −1.2 2.1 0.498
Nurses 71 75 15.7 57 71 15.3 43 −2.7 1.7
Perception of management Doctors 37 63 17.9 0.023 31 57 16.3 0.081 18 1.4 2.2 0.005
Nurses 69 56 14.9 55 51 15.7 41 −8.4 2.9
Safety Climate Doctors 30 66 14.9 0.056 30 63 14.0 0.307 14 −1.8 3.4 0.907
Nurses 67 60 14.6 51 60 13.9 38 3.1 2.4
Stress recognition Doctors 44 76 16.8 0.013 36 73 14.0 0.690 23 −2.2 3.3 0.638
Nurses 73 66 20.6 57 71 19.8 43 4.1 2.5
Working Conditions Doctors 30 70 15.2 0.005 26 65 15.6 0.072 11 2.3 4.4 0.132
Nurses 65 61 14.1 48 59 13.4 36 −2.3 2.0
Domain Score in SAQ at two different time points reported in the different domains, before (baseline) and after (post-intervention) a change in the use of WHO
checklist. All domains on a scale 0–100, presented as mean value where 0 = Disagree strongly, 100 = Agree Strongly. P-values are a comparison between doctors
and nurses perception of different domains. Doctors = surgeons and anesthesiologist. Nurses = scrub nurses, nurse anaesthetists, nurse assistants
aParticipants answering both SAQ baseline and SAQ post-intervention












valueMean (SD) Mean (SD)
Teamwork climate 106 65 (15.2) 88 64 (13.2) 63 0.3 1.4 ns
Job satisfaction 114 75 (15.2) 94 72 (14.2) 65 −2.2 1.3 ns
Perception of management 106 58 (16.3) 86 53 (16.1) 59 −5.4 2.2 0.016
Safety climate 97 62 (14.9) 81 61 (13.9) 52 1.8 2.0 ns
Stress recognition 118 70 (19.6) 93 72 (17.7) 66 1.9 2.0 ns
Working conditions 95 64 (15.0) 74 61 (14.4) 47 −1.2 1.8 ns
Domain Score in SAQ before (baseline) and after (post-intervention) the use of the revised version of the WHO checklist
Standard Error of the Mean change
a All domains on a scale 0–100, presented as mean value where 0 = Disagree strongly, 100 = Agree Strongly. Scores over 75 are taken as positive
b Participants answering both SAQ baseline and SAQ post-intervention
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intervention questionnaire rendering 438 suggestions on
how to improve patient safety.
When analyzed the answers from baseline and post-
intervention did not differ and together the answers re-
sulted in two categories.
Knowledge and mastering of non-technical skills to improve
patient safety
The most comprehensive category contains various as-
pects of the operating room teams’ perceptions of non-
technical skills and their importance for patient safety in
the operating room. Fifty participants representing all
professional categories mentioned the WHO checklist as
an improvement of patient safety. Many commented on
the significance of the team focus during the review of
the checklist, and on the importance of always using the
checklist. At baseline, there was a demand for more ex-
tended information about the surgical procedure during
‘Time out’. Surgeons, anesthesiologists and nurses listed
pre-operative planning such as detailing needs for spe-
cific instruments, patient position as well as anatomical
steps during the surgical procedure as important for pa-
tient safety. Improving the communication within the
operating room was considered very important by all
professions. Many of the participants commented on the
importance of an open climate where everyone is free to
speak up and communicate with each other independent
of status and profession. Eighty-eight comments from all
professions were made regarding the importance of en-
hanced teamwork to increase the dedication from the
team in the operating room. Cooperation, kindness and
respect for one another were mentioned multiple times.
Working in the same team regularly was considered im-
portant for improved teamwork. Surgeons and scrub
nurses commented on the importance of focus on the
surgical procedure by all professions. Limiting the num-
ber of persons present in the operating room and de-
creasing the noise level were mentioned to help focus.
Many surgeons mentioned intra-operative disruptions,
such as coffee breaks for team members as negatively af-
fecting patient safety. It was suggested that everyone in the
team should have structured breaks at the same time to
avoid distractions. Another suggestion was to have a more
flexible system for intra-operative pauses and lunch breaks.
Improved management and structure
Comments were made regarding a need for changes at
the management level. There were comments on stress-
ful situations due to unsatisfactory staffing levels, such
as ‘Inadequate number of operations, due to the staffing
of the operating department’. Some surgeons wanted im-
proved logistics between operations to decrease turnover
time. Participants mentioned the importance of adher-
ence to guidelines in order to improve safety. ‘To follow
guidelines and evidence based clinical routines’.
Surgeons, anesthesiologists and nurses asked for more
profound knowledge and competence among the operat-
ing room personnel. Education, thorough introduction
and learning from mistakes were suggested.
Discussion
In this study we found that operating room team mem-
bers reported a need for improved teamwork and com-
munication within the team. We found a lack of
structure in the usage of the WHO checklist. Based on
this a revision of the WHO checklist was devised and
implemented. However this revision did not affect the
teamwork climate measurements, nor communication
and collaboration and we conclude that the intervention
did not enhance patient safety. These results may be due
to the inability to fully implement the new checklist as
observations revealed that adherence to the revised
checklist was insufficient. Variability in checklist-
compliance is a well-known phenomenon [16, 17].
The hypothesis was that the use of a revised checklist
based on suggestions from the focus groups would en-
hance teamwork and indirectly improve patient safety.
Although the open-ended question in SAQ revealed that
the participants regarded good communication among
operating team members as important there still seemed
to be deficiencies. We found that different professions
regarded communication and collaboration within their
own profession as good, but not to the same extent be-
tween professions. It was interesting to find the
Table 4 Quality of communication and collaboration between operating room team members





assistantsConsultants Attendings Residents Interns Consultants Attendings Residents Interns
Surgeons (n = 28) 93 64 50 50 64 46 36
Anesthesiologists (n = 18) 33 33 56 67 56 83 61
Scrub nurses (n = 22) 36 27 23 18 77 77 59
Nurse anaesthetists (n = 28) 29 14 75 71 68 82 50
Nurse assistants (n =24) 42 17 46 42 75 71 71
Communication and collaboration as appreciated among professions at baseline. Presented as percentage of participants who answered “high” or “very high”.
Italics when a profession estimated communication and collaboration within their own profession
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contradiction that surgeons were the most positive re-
garding communication and collaboration with other
surgeons but given the lowest rating by other team
members. Similar results were found by Makary et al
who showed that 87% of the surgeons rated communica-
tion and collaboration with operating room nurses as
good while only 48% of the nurses rated surgeons as good
communicators [18]. Lack of adequate communication
and collaboration between surgeons and scrub nurses was
also reflected in the domain teamwork climate where
scrub nurses was the profession which rated teamwork
the lowest, a pattern also found in research by Sexton et
al. [19].
At SAQ baseline many of the participants commented
on the importance of an open climate regardless of pro-
fession. Enhanced teamwork was suggested to increase
commitment. Previous research has shown associations
between leader inclusiveness and team engagement in
quality improvement in health care [20]. Adding the
item ‘description of the surgical procedure’ to ‘Time out’
was intended to increase the involvement of the team
members through greater knowledge of the specific pro-
cedure and a feeling of inclusion. Another objective was
to improve situational awareness which has been associ-
ated with fewer surgical errors [21]. Low levels of shared
understanding among professionals in the operating
room team may reduce efficient teamwork [22].
At baseline we discovered a need for structure and fur-
ther education regarding the WHO checklist. There was
uncertainty regarding the designated checklist coordin-
ator and what this role included. The nurse assistants
found it difficult to initiate ‘Time out’ as their role was
insufficiently recognized [23]. To successfully manage
the checklist it is important that the checklist coordin-
ator has the support of staff in more senior positions
[20, 24]. We instructed the team to acknowledge the
nurse assistant as the checklist coordinator and intro-
duced a paper-checklist to be filled out. However, this
did not seem to be sufficient, according to observations
of how the checklist was used.
We failed to fully implement the revised checklist. In-
terventions to improve the safety climate require strong
commitment and support by the management and initial
education and training of employees [25–27]. Previous
research has also suggested that success requires the
support from at least twenty-five percent of the targeted
population [28]. The fact that this intervention was led
by a scrub nurse, and that nurse assistants were checklist
coordinators can have influenced the results [29]. In the
hierarchical hospital system it is important who is the
person in charge of the intervention, as senior surgeons
are probably more likely to successfully implement a
changed routine than nurses are [25, 29]. Including phy-
sicians in the tailoring of the checklist facilitates the
implementation process [29]. Although we included
managers, middle-managers and the operating room
team in the intervention, it was probably not enough to
have the anticipated effect on teamwork climate. The
fact that the anesthesiologists were unwilling to partici-
pate in the focus groups may have influenced the out-
come. Not participating in the focus groups meant that
the anesthesiologists not only missed an opportunity for
education regarding the checklist, but also that they did
not have input into the revision of the checklist. The
anesthesiologist were also the profession with the lowest
SAQ response rate, 69% and 40% answered SAQ at base-
line and post-intervention respectively. The lack of com-
pliance with the intervention is demonstrated both by
the absence of the anesthesiologists in the focus groups
and in the post-interventional observations where we
found that the team members did not use the checklist
as intended. Other limitations to this study were that we
did not have a control group. It is also possible that two
independent observers, not included in the study design,
would have contributed to a higher validity without pos-
sible expectancy bias. A strength was that the SAQ was
assessed both at baseline and post-intervention enabling
intra-individual comparisons. The relatively high compli-
ance indicated that staff found the study important and
trusted the design regarding the participants’ anonymity.
Conclusions
There was no significant change in teamwork climate by
the use of the revised WHO checklist. This may be due to
insufficient implementation, as a lack of adherence to the
WHO checklist was detected as well as lack of participa-
tion in the focus group meetings. We found deficiencies
in teamwork and communication. Further studies explor-
ing how to improve safety climate are needed.
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